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 Introduction 
Disastrous events such as extreme weather events are increasing every day and causing exten-
sive damage to the critical transportation, water and energy infrastructure. Consequently, adopt-
ing adaptive measures to increase resilience is becoming more important as the severity of 
extreme weather events, and their effect on society, security and the economy, increases. There-
fore, there is a global consensus that the critical infrastructure resilience needs promotion. A 
resilient system reacts quickly in which the consequence of occurrence of any inconven-
ience/impact on the system is minimised. On the contrary, a vulnerable system can result to a 
high level of distress, as it is not able to respond to the strains. In synthesis, a vulnerable system 
discharges a more negative and heavier impact on its users and manager whereas a resilient 
system functions in such a way that the users and managers do not experience any negative 
impact on usual infrastructure functionality and service.  
To assess the level of resilience of any infrastructure system it is important to define resilience 
and its metrics first. Resilience is a concept intertwined with vulnerability, intended as series of 
elements present within a system, prior to the occurrence of hazards, which can affect ability 
of the system to cope with and recover from the resulting impacts. Collectively literature con-
tains a wide range of definitions, metrics and measurement methodologies proposed for critical 
infrastructure resilience quantification. For example, resilience has been defined as the ability 
of a system, community, society to “resist the impact of a natural or social event” [8], “to react 
and recover from the damaging effect of realized hazards” [4]; and “the capacity for renewal, 
reorganization and development” [5]. [1] defines the resilience as the difference from full per-
formance to disrupted performance (from time where disruption occurs to time which system 
returns to its normal pre-disruption. [9] uses the same Triangle resilience idea and defines the 
loss of resilience as the percentage of the total possible loss over some suitably long time inter-
val. [6] defines resilience as ratio of recovery to loss. However, a standardised metric or meas-
urement for resilience, which assures its effectiveness and keeping the promotion cost at an 
acceptable level, remains a challenging to [7]. This study addresses this issue by evaluating the 
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correlation between the system behaviour and a few selected widely used resilience metrics. 
This study is limited to metric and formula for infrastructure resilience. [2] suggest that resili-
ence has four dimensions: 1. Technical dimension:  focusing on system’s performance after a 
shock hits; 2.organizational: focusing on the organisations’ ability to respond to the challenge 
posed by the hazard and still carry out their key functions; 3.social: “the capacity to reduce the 
negative societal consequences of loss of critical services” and 4. economic: referring to the 
ability of avoiding economic losses as a consequence of the disaster.  
This study only focuses on the technical dimension in which the functionality has been used to 
quantify system resilience (so-called operational resilience). There are a series of metrics that 
can be used to quantify system resilience. In this article, five widely used metrics have been 
reviewed and applied to a simple hypothetical benchmark network to illustrate differences in 
the quantification techniques. These techniques and their application to case study are provided 
in section 2.4. 
 
 Method of Analysis 
In this study, global resilience approach is adopted to evaluate the performance of a simple 
benchmark network when subject to a range of failure states (FS). Figure 1 demonstrates 
the flowchart of the methodology for global resilience evaluation in this study. The meth-
odology comprises of three following sections:   
 Network failure state: this section characterises the failure type(s) and failed ele-
ment(s) (what fail/failed); 
 Network operational fluctuation: this section illustrates network elements’ (e.g. 
nodes, links) potential behavioural change in response to the FS(s); 
 Resilience evaluation: this section adopts six widely used resilience quantification 
methods to evaluate the benchmark network resiliency by incorporating the FS(s) 
and operational fluctuation(s) into the evaluation process.  
 
 
Figure 1: Flowchart of the methodology 
2.1 Benchmark Network 
For this study, a simple hypothetical benchmark network, with five nodes (including 
source and sink nodes) and five links (see Figure 2), was created for global resilience 
evaluation. This benchmark network is a very simple and miniaturised version of similar 
infrastructure networks (e.g. water supply system, railway and road system and so on) 
therefore the technique can be expanded, adapted and applied to complicated networks.  
  
Figure 2: Hypothetical benchmark network 
2.2 Network Failure State 
Failure State represents the existing condition (operational condition and/or physical con-
dition) of a network that has the potential to cause network failure (partially or fully), 
regardless of the origin, type and severity of the initial hazardous event (e.g. extreme 
rainfall, earthquake, etc.). To characterise a network FS, type (operational/physical; par-
tially/fully) and location (node/link) of that should be determined (what fail/failed).  
In this benchmark network, two FSs could be characterised: node failure and link failure. 
Nevertheless, in a real network, FSs will have operational and/or physical context. For 
example, in water distribution systems: pressure drop, pump failure, pipe leakage; in 
sewer system: pipe blockage; in transport system: road closure, accident. In this study, 
global resilience is evaluated when the network is subject to link(s) failure involving ran-
dom cumulative elements. Figure 4 presents sixteen potential FSs (i.e. link failure) for 
this benchmark network as, one link at a time – four scenarios; two links at a time – seven 
scenarios; three links at a time – four scenarios; four links at a time – one scenario. 
Note: the link to the sink node is not included in the evaluation process for simplicity. In 
addition, in this study simultaneous FSs are assumed in this network (no particular order).  
 
 
Figure 4: Network failure states 
2.3 Network Operational Fluctuation 
Interrupting events (shocks and stresses), regardless of their origin, type, duration, fre-
quency and severity, will change the whole system behavior. These behavioral changes 
are arisen from aggregation of the operational fluctuations of the network elements. This 
study illustrates the aforementioned fluctuations as operational time series of each ele-
ment. For example, in water supply system, this could be interpreted as the pipes pressure 
variation or in sewer system as manholes’ surcharge and in transport system as traffic 
congestion in a road.  
To study the operational fluctuations of each element, three parameters of duration of 
failure (Fdur), magnitude of failure (Fmag) and frequency of failure (Ffreq) are taken into 
account (see Table 1). Each parameter will have two modes and their associated values. 
For simplicity, the values presented in Table 1, are dimensionless and scaled into the 
range [0-1].  
Table 1: Network operational fluctuation modes 
Parameter Mode Value  
(dimensionless) 
Duration of failure (Fdur) Short 0.1 
Long 0.4 
Magnitude of Failure (Fmag) Small 0.4 
Large 1 
Frequency of failure (Ffreq) Single Occurrence 1 
Frequent Occurrence 5 
 
The above six modes constitute eight different operational fluctuation scenarios as out-
lined in Table 2. 
Table 2: Network operational fluctuation scenarios  
Short-Small-Single     (SSS) 
Short-Small-Frequent (SSF) 
Short-Large-Single     (SLS) 
Short-Large-Frequent (SLF) 
Long-Small-Single     (LSS) 
Long-Small-Frequent (LSF) 
Long-Large-Single     (LLS) 
Long-Large-Frequent (LLF) 
 
It should be noted that for simplicity in this study, frequent fluctuations (i.e. SSF, SLF, 
LSF, LLF in Table 2) will all have the same Fdur and Fmag. For instance, Figure 3 repre-
sents a LLF operational fluctuation scenario (OFS).  
 
Figure 3: LLF network operational scenario 
2.4 Resilience  
In this study, six widely used resilience quantification methods, which are in fact surrogate 
measures of resilience, are used to evaluate the benchmark network performance. These meth-
ods are as follows: 
 
 Bounce backability – Time Independent (BBA-TID): maximum flow to initial maxi-
mum flow [6]; 
 Residence time in Failure State (RFS): total duration of being in failure state [3]; 
 Residence time in non-Failure State (RNFS): total duration of not being in failure state 
[3]; 
 Time in Failure State (TFS): average time of being in failure state [3]; 
 Time in non-Failure State (TNFS): average time of not being in failure state [3]. 
 
2.5 Results 
The current section presents the results of the analysis conducted on the case study illustrating 
differences between resilience metrics and OFS. Figure 4 illustrates the variation of different 
resilience metrics for different OFS in 100 realisation of Monte Carlo simulations in which the 
time lag is randomly generated. The horizontal axis in these figures corresponds to resilience 
metrics (five metrics) × OFS (six scenarios) and the vertical axis shows resilience value. Figure 
1.a demonstrates that BBA-TID has minimum variation in all OFS, RFS, RNFS are next, which 
shows the independency of the resilience metrics with the time lag of failure. TNFS however 
illustrates the maximum variation in resilience metrics in which the metric is varying from zero 
to 0.8. Nevertheless, this variation has declined significantly when the number of failed links 
increase (i.e. Figures 4b-d). The opposite phenomenon is happening for the BBA-TID, RFS and 
RNFS metrics, which are quite consistent in one link failure scenario. This can be explained by 
the fact that bounce backability metric can significantly vary when the time lags of failed links 
synchronized and result in bigger variation. Given that the network sample chosen for this study 
only contains five links, variation in time lag cannot make huge difference in failure or non-
failure state duration. This explains the small variation of these metrics in scenarios with more 
than one failed link. 
 Figure 4: resilience variation in all potential failure states of the network;  
a: no. of failed links: 1, link no.: 1; b: no. of failed links: 2, link no.: 1, 3;  
c: no. of failed links: 3, link no.: 1, 3, 4; d: no. of failed links: 4, link no.: 1,2,3,4 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the variation of resilience metrics for four selected links’ OFS in area plot. 
Comparing different scenarios, it can be seen that TNFS is zero for link failure scenarios of 3-
link and 4-link scenarios at SSF, SLF, LSS and LLS. Frequent failure state, long failure duration 
and high failure magnitude for failure scenarios with more than two links results in highest time 
in failure state (maximum RFS and TFS) which naturally would mean minimum TNFS (which 
also means minimum RNFS). This is also true for scenarios with two links on the opposite sides 
(i.e., 1 and 2/4 or 2 and 1/3) which result in zero flow in the network. 
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 Figure 5: resilience variation in operatioanl fluctuations;  
a: no. of failed links: 1, link no.: 1; b: no. of failed links: 2, link no.: 1, 3;  
c: no. of failed links: 3, link no.: 1, 3, 4; d: no. of failed links: 4, link no.: 1, 2, 3, 4 
 
In conclusion, by categorising the resilience metrics, it can be seen that RNFS, TNFS, BBA-
TIS would fall in one category in which the resilience metric decreases by an increase in number 
of failed links. In these metrics, the failure of two links falls in two different subcategories in 
which failure of links from opposite sides results in higher value in comparison to failed links 
on one side (i.e., failure of link 1 and 2 result in higher value in comparison to failure of link 1 
and 3). The RFS falls in the next category in which an increase in number of failed links in-
creases the resilience metric. The TFS was expected to follow the same pattern; however, the 
result from 100 realisation of Monte Carlo simulation shows that this metric does not exactly 
fall in this pattern. In this metric, the 2-link failure scenarios in LLS and LSS result in lower 
value in comparison to 3-link and 4-link scenarios. This is not consistent with the pattern in 
other scenarios (i.e., SSS, SSF, SLS, and SLF) which is mainly due to the small difference 
between the resilience metric of 2-link, 3-link and 4-link scenarios.  
a b 
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